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Abstract There are two very different ways of thinking about perception.
According to the first one, perception is representational: it represents the world as
being a certain way. According to the second, perception is a genuine relation
between the perceiver and a token object. These two views are thought to be
incompatible. My aim is to work out the least problematic version of the repre-
sentational view of perception that preserves the most important considerations in
favor of the relational view. According to this version of representationalism, the
properties represented in perception are tropes—abstract particulars that are logi-
cally incapable of being present in two distinct individuals at the same time. I call
this view ‘trope representationalism’.
1 Introduction: Two Ways of Thinking About Perception
There are two very different ways of thinking about perception. The first one is this.
Perceptual experiences are representations: they represent the world as being a
certain way. They have content, which may or may not be different from the content
of beliefs. They represent objects as having properties, sometimes veridically,
sometimes not.
According to the other influential (and more and more influential) view,
perception is a relation between the agent and the perceived object. Perceived
objects are literally constituents of our perceptual experiences. Perceptual experi-
ences are not representations: the perceived object is not represented by our
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perceptual experience: it is part of our perceptual experience. Following John
Campbell, I will label these views the ‘representational’ and the ‘relational’ view,
respectively (Campbell 2002). I use these as convenient labels, but it needs to be
acknowledged that both the ‘representational’ and the ‘relational’ view come in a
variety of forms (see Pautz forthcoming b and Siegel 2010, esp. Section VI for
rudimentary classifications).
My aim is to outline a new version of the representational view that is capable of
preserving the most important considerations in favor of the relational view.
According to this version of the representational view, the properties represented in
perception are tropes: abstract particulars that are logically incapable of being
present in two distinct individuals at the same time. I will argue that this version of
the representational view can preserve the most important considerations in favor of
the relational view.
The plan of the paper is the following. I will not give any argument in favor of
representationalism. I aim to show that if someone is drawn to representationalism,
then my version is their best bet against the relationalist objections. First, I outline
the challenge that relationalism poses to the representational view of perception
(Sect. 2). Then, I present the proposal that the properties represented in perception
are tropes (and not property-types) (Sect. 3) and argue that if we accept this proposal
about the perceptual representation of tropes, we can give a version of the
representational view that has the best chance to do justice to the most important
considerations in favor of the relational view (Sect. 4).
2 Relationalist Arguments Against Representationalism
Philosophers, psychologists and cognitive scientists often talk about perceptual
experiences, or perceptual states in general, as representations. Many of our mental
states are representational. Most of our emotions, for example, are about something:
we are afraid of a lion, fond of chocolate mousse, etc. The same goes for beliefs,
desires and imaginings. It seems natural then to suppose that perceptual experiences
are also representations: when I see a cat, my perceptual experience is about this cat:
it refers to this cat. My perceptual experience represents this particular as having a
number of properties and the content of my perceptual experience is the sum total of
these properties (see Nanay 2010).
Describing perceptual experiences as representations has some important
explanatory advantages (see Pautz 2010 for a summary). I will not survey these
advantages here as the aim of this paper is to give the least problematic version of
representationalism: the structure of my argument is to assume that representation-
alism is correct and attempt to meet the challenge posed by the relational view of
perception.
Although considering perceptual experiences to be representations may be a
natural way of describing our perceptual system and this assumption dominated both
the philosophical and the psychological research on perception, some have recently
questioned this entire framework. The proposal is that perceptual experiences are not
representations: they are constituted, in part, by the actual perceived objects.
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Perception is a genuine relation between the perceiver and the perceived object—and
not between the agent and some abstract entity called ‘perceptual content’.
2.1 The Particularity of Perception
One of the arguments in favor of this ‘relational view’ is that if we assume that
perception is representational, then we lose the intuitively plausible assumption that
the object of our perceptual experience is always a particular token object. The charge
is that the representational view is committed to saying that the content of perceptual
experiences is something general. Although this claim may not be justified in the case
of certain versions of the representational view (ones that hold that perceptual
experiences have object-involving, or maybe gappy, content—see Sect. 4.3 below), it
does pose an important question. If the content of a perceptual experience is taken to
be the conditions under which this experience is correct (Peacocke 1989, 1992), then
how can this content specify a token object? It specifies only the conditions a token
object needs to satisfy. And then any token object that satisfies these conditions would
equally qualify as the object of this perceptual experience. Suppose that I am looking
at a pillow. Replacing this pillow with another, indistinguishable, pillow would not
make a difference in the content of my perceptual experience. On these two occasions
the content of my perceptual experience is identical (and the phenomenal character of
my perceptual experience is also identical—the two pillows are indistinguishable,
after all). Thus, according to the representational view, we cannot distinguish between
these two experiences. But their objects are very different (see Soteriou 2000 for a
good summary on the particularity of perception).
The relational view, in contrast, insists that perceptual experiences are constituted
by relations to something particular. Replacing the pillow with another, indistin-
guishable, pillow would give rise to an entirely different (but maybe indistinguish-
able) perceptual experience. We have to be careful about what is meant by the
identity or difference of our experiences, as one clear disagreement between the
relational and the representational view is whether these two experiences are
identical or different. What the debate is about is clearly not token-identity: both
camps agree that the two experiences are not token-identical. But if the disagreement
between the representationalists and the relationalists is about whether my
experience of the first pillow and my experience of the second, indistinguishable,
pillow are of the same type, then this disagreement no longer seems very clear, as
there are many ways of typing experiences. Even the relationalists would agree that
we can type these two experiences in such a way that the two token experiences
would both belong to the same type, say, the type of experiences in general. And even
the representationalists could say that there are ways of typing these two experiences
so that they end up belonging to different types.
It has been suggested that the real question is whether these two experiences belong
not just to the same type but whether they belong to ‘‘the same fundamental kind’’
(Martin 2004, p. 39, p. 43). The representational view says they do; the relational view
says they don’t. Belonging to a ‘fundamental kind’ is supposed to ‘‘tell what
essentially the event or episode is’’ (Martin 2006, p. 361). Those, like me, who are
suspicious of anything ‘fundamental’ or ‘essential’, will not find these considerations
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too compelling (see Byrne and Logue 2008, especially Section 7.1, for a thorough
analysis of the ‘fundamental kind’ version of the relational view). Nevertheless, the
argument from the particularity of perception in favor of the relational view can be
rephrased without any appeal to ‘fundamental kinds’: the representationalist does not
have any principled way of differentiating the two experiences of the two pillows.1
The relationalist does.
2.2 Perception and Demonstrative Reference
Another reason for being relationalist is the following. Perceptual experiences,
whatever they are, must be able to ground our demonstrative thoughts. As John
Campbell put it, ‘‘a characterization of the phenomenal content of experience of
objects has to show how it is that experience, so described, can be what makes it
possible for us to think about those objects demonstratively’’ (Campbell 2002, p. 114).
Campbell argues that the relational view can fulfill this explanatory task, whereas
the representational view cannot. His example is the following. Suppose that I am
eavesdropping on my neighbor’s daily activities, while I have never been in his
apartment. On the basis of the sound of his electric razor, I come to the conclusion
that he has a mirror on the wall that divides his apartment from mine. I can have
thoughts about this mirror and I can refer to it. After years of eavesdropping, I
finally get to see my neighbor’s apartment and the mirror on the wall as well. As
Campbell says, ‘‘the contrast between the knowledge you have now, on the basis of
a look at the objects and the knowledge you had before of the existence of objects
with particular functional roles, is that when you see the thing, you are confronted
by the individual substance itself. On seeing it, you no longer have knowledge of the
object merely as the postulated occupant of a particular functional role. Your
experience of the object, when you see it, provides you with knowledge of the
categorical grounds of the collections of dispositions you had earlier postulated’’
(Campbell 2002, pp. 114–115).
If we think of perceptual experiences the way the representationalist does, we
cannot account for this difference, since, according to the representational view,
perceptual experience can only specify the ‘‘existence of objects with particular
functional roles’’ or ‘‘the postulated occupant of a particular functional role’’. The
representationalist cannot account for the fact that ‘‘experience of the object can
confront you with the individual substance itself, the categorical basis of the
dispositional relations in which the object may stand to other things’’ (Campbell
2002, p. 116). In short, the representational view cannot account for the genuine
relation between the agent and a token object, which is supposed to serve as the
ground for our demonstrative thoughts.
1 It is important to emphasize that this objection fails to apply in the case of some versions of the
representational view, including those versions that take perceptual content to be Russellian, gappy,
singular, object-involving or singular-when-filled (see, e.g., Soteriou 2000; Tye 2007; Schellenberg
2010). See also Sect. 4.3 below.
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2.3 Direct Realism
So it seems that there are some fairly strong considerations in favor of the relational
view of perception. I argue in what follows that if the properties we represent
perceptually are tropes, then we can give a version of the representational view of
perception that preserves these considerations in favor of the relational view.
3 Trope Representationalism
According to the representational view of perception, perception represents objects
as having properties. A natural question then to ask is what kinds of properties are
being represented in perception. Shape, size and color properties are obvious
candidates and it is a delicate question what other kinds of properties are also
perceptually represented (some important candidates: sortal properties (Siegel
2006a), dispositional properties (Nanay forthcoming b), or the property of being
edible (Nanay forthcoming a, forthcoming c and forthcoming d). A different way of
raising the same question concerns the determinacy of these properties: does
perception attribute determinable or determinate properties? (see Nanay 2010) But
there is yet another way of raising the question about what kinds of properties are
represented in perception and this is the one we are interested in here: is it property-
types (or universals) or property-instances (or tropes) that we represent in
perception?2
The term ‘property’ is ambiguous. It can mean universals: properties that can be
present in two (or more) distinct individuals at the same time. But it can also mean
tropes: abstract particulars that are logically incapable of being present in two (or
more) distinct individuals at the same time (Williams 1953; Campbell 1990; Bacon
1995; Schaffer 2001).
Suppose that the color of my neighbor’s black car and my black car are
indistinguishable. They still have different tropes. The blackness trope of my car is
different from the blackness trope of my neighbor’s car. These two tropes are
similar but numerically distinct. Thus, the blackness of my car and the blackness of
my neighbor’s car are different properties.
If, in contrast, we interpret properties as universals, or, as I will refer to them,
property-types, then the two cars instantiate the same property-type: blackness.
Thus, depending on which notion of property we talk about, we have to give
different answers to the question about whether the color-property of the two cars is
the same or different. If by ‘property’ we mean ‘trope’, then my car has a different
(but similar) color-property, that is, color-trope, from my neighbor’s. If, however,
by ‘property’ we mean ‘property-type’, then my car has the very same property, that
is, property-type, as my neighbor’s.3
2 It is important that the question is about what properties we perceptually attribute to the perceived
scene. This is not necessarily the same question as asking what properties we take ourselves to be
perceiving.
3 An anonymous reviewer for this journal pointed out that the trope representationalist account could
deliver the same results even if the perceptual content consisted of both tropes and property-types—it is
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It has been argued that the disagreement between those who take properties to be
tropes and those who take properties to be universals or property-types is a merely
verbal one: all claims about (and even arguments for the existence of) tropes can be
rephrased in terms of instantiations of property-types (Daly 1997). Conversely, as
we can think of property-types as resemblance classes of tropes, all claims about
property-types can be rephrased in terms of tropes. Whether or not these claims
about ontological equivalence are correct (see Nanay 2009 for an argument against),
it is important to note that representing something as having tropes and representing
it as having property-types will still give rise to very different content (as perceptual
content is taken to be the sum total of represented properties). And the aim of this
paper is to argue that if it is true that our perceptual content consists of tropes but no
property-types, then we can give a version of the representational view that can
accommodate the most important relationalist considerations. I call this view the
‘trope representationalist view’ of perception.
It is important to dispel a couple of possible ways of misinterpreting the claim
that the properties represented in perception are tropes. First, and perhaps most
importantly, this paper is not about the grand debate concerning the object of
perception (Clarke 1965; Strawson 1979; Noe¨ 2004, p. 76). If I am looking at a cat,
what is it that I perceive? Do I perceive the entire cat? Or those parts of the cat that
are visible? Or maybe the front surface of the cat? I will not say anything about
these classic questions. My question is not about what the object of our perception is
but what sort of properties we perceive the object of perception as having.
It is also important to acknowledge another way of bringing in tropes in the
discussion of perception, something I am not concerned with here (see, for example,
Lowe 1998). If we accept a version of the causal theory of perception, then there is a
causal relation between what we perceive and our experience (Grice 1961; Strawson
1974; Lewis 1980) and if we hold that the relata of (singular) causation are tropes
(Ehring 1997), then we have a neat argument for the claim that what we perceive are
tropes. Besides noting that the second premise of this argument is not that
unproblematic—there are other important candidates for causal relata, like events
(Davidson 1967), facts (Mellor 1995), states of affairs (Armstrong 1997)—, it is
again important to point out that the question I am interested in here is not about the
nature of the causal component of perception but about the nature of the properties
our perceptual experiences attribute to the perceived scene.
Yet another way in which tropes may be thought to play a crucial role in
perception is the following. Even if we do not endorse the view that tropes are the
Footnote 3 continued
not needed that all properties represented in our perceptual experiences would be tropes, only that some
are. This is true and those who are drawn to such a picture of perceptual content can adjust the account I
outline here accordingly. But I will not do so here. As we shall see in Sect. 4.3, an important virtue of the
trope representationalist account is that it leads to a very simple conception of perceptual content: the
perceptual content is just the sum total of the perceptually attributed tropes. If there were both tropes and
property-types in the perceptual content, we would need to be able to have a story about the relation
between these two kinds of properties within the perceptual content and this would lead to quite a
complicated account of perceptual content. Again, such account would be consistent with the general
framework I am proposing here, but in order to preserve the simplicity of perceptual content in my
account of trope representationalism, I do not explore this option further here.
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relata of (singular) causation, we may still hold that tropes play an important role in
singular causation. Suppose that (Davidsonian) events are the relata of causation. In
this case, a further question arises. What is it in virtue of which one event causes
another? One possible answer to this question is that events cause other events in
virtue of having tropes: the sleeping pill I took last night made me fall asleep in
virtue of having a certain trope (see Nanay 2009; see also Robb 1997’s similar claim
in the context of mental causation). Again, if we combine this claim with the causal
theory of perception, what we get is that the perceived object causes our experience
in virtue of having certain tropes. This may or may not be true, but what is important
for our purposes is that this is a very different claim from that one that is at stake in
this paper. The claim I will argue for is that we perceive objects as having tropes.
Whether they cause my experience in virtue of having tropes is a very different
question.
Two further important points of clarification are in order. First, the claim that the
properties represented in perception are tropes does not imply that we are
consciously aware of tropes as tropes. The claim I am making is about what
properties we attribute in perception and not about what properties we take
ourselves to attribute in perception. Second, in order to perceive an object as having
a trope, we clearly do not have to master the concept of trope: those humans and
non-human animals who have not read any metaphysics papers are still capable of
perceiving the world.
The claim that the properties represented in perception are tropes can mean a
number of things, depending on our assumptions about the way perception
represents these tropes. It may mean that we represent a specific object as having
tropes. Or that we represent a spatial region as having tropes. And it may also mean
that we represent tropes only (and maybe the representation of objects supervenes
on our representation of tropes).4
These three versions will give us a different picture about what the object of our
perception is: As I want to remain neutral with regards to the big debate about the
object of our perception, I will also remain neutral as to whether we perceive objects
as having tropes, tropes as being localized somewhere in space or just tropes
themselves. It is important to note, however, that all these versions agree that
everything represented in perception, that is, both what we represent and the
properties we represent it as having, are particulars, so representing x as having a
trope F could be considered to be a notional variant of representing the thing that
has trope F as being x. For simplicity, I will say that we represent the object in front
of us as having tropes.
Thus, my claim is that we perceptually represent objects as having tropes. Only
tropes are part of our perceptual content, not property-types. Hence, perceptual
content is very different from the content of our (non-singular) beliefs (as these,
generally, represent objects as having property-types).
4 Kevin Mulligan, one of the most important proponents of the idea that the properties we perceive are
tropes, argues that we should endorse the last version. We can perceive the scarletness of the table without
perceiving the table as being scarlet: I may not recognize the scarlet thing as a table, after all (Mulligan
et al. 1984, p. 307).
Perceiving tropes
123
The idea that we perceive tropes is not new. In fact, it was one of the reasons why
tropes were postulated to begin with (Campbell 1981, p. 481; see also Campbell
1990—although the core idea of tropes may go back to Husserl, see Mulligan 1995;
see also Kriegel 2004 for a related but somewhat different claim).
Kevin Mulligan, who uses slightly different terminology as he talks about
moments (instead of tropes), gives the following reductio argument for the claim
that perception attributes tropes (Mulligan et al. 1984; Mulligan 1999). Suppose that
the properties we represent perceptually are not tropes. This would mean that we
perceptually represent instantiations of universals. But, Mulligan argues, this is
extremely counterintuitive: when we are looking at a scarlet table, we do not see a
particular as instantiating the universal of scarletness. We just see a particular.
Taking every single perceptual episode to amount to perceiving a particular as
instantiating a universal would seriously over-intellectualize perception. As
Mulligan says, ‘‘whoever wishes to reject moments must of course give an account
of those cases where we seem to see and hear them, cases we report, using definite
descriptions such as ‘the smile that just appeared on Rupert’s face. This means that
he must claim that in such circumstances we see not just independent things per se,
but also things as falling under certain concepts or as exemplifying certain
universals’’ (Mulligan et al. 1984, p. 300). But this, so the argument goes, would
clearly over-intellectualize perception as it would follow from this claim that we
perceptually attribute the exemplification relation all the time and it is not even clear
that exemplification relation is something that can be perceptually attributed.
Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra raised an important objection against these claims
(Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, pp. 93–95). He points out that perceiving x as F does not
imply that I perceive what makes this so, that is, what makes it the case that x is F
(Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002, p. 94; Susanna Siegel gives a very similar argument in
Siegel 2005, 2009, see also Nanay forthcoming b on this argument). We can see
something as being made of ice, without seeing it as being made of H2O molecules
of certain kinetic energy. Similarly, we can see the table as being scarlet without
seeing what makes it so (namely that it instantiates the scarlet property-type).5
So we do not seem to have any conclusive argument for the claim that perception
attributes tropes. But recall the structure of my argument. I make a conditional
claim. If we assume that the properties represented in perception are tropes, then we
can preserve the explanatory advantages of the representational view as well as
many explanatory advantages of the relational view. I do not give independent
arguments in favor of the antecedent of this conditional. But this conditional claim
itself may give us some reason to accept the antecedent of the conditional: that the
properties represented in perception are tropes. In any case, the aim of this paper is
to argue in favor of this conditional claim, without worrying too much about the
truth of the antecedent.
5 Rodriguez-Pereyra is not aiming to defend the ontology of universals, but he notes that Mulligan’s
argument also applies in the case of resemblance nominalism, Rodriguez-Pereyra’s own view.
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4 The Advantages of Trope Representationalism
Trope representationalism is a version of the representational view, as our
perceptual experiences would still be representations that may or may not be correct
and it depends on the world in front of us whether they are correct. But it would also
accommodate the main consideration behind the relational view—that there is
something particular about our perception: our perceptual experience is constituted
by a genuine relation between two particular token entities: the perceiver and the
trope her experience represents. But let us proceed more slowly.
I am looking at a green chair. My perceptual experience represents the object in
front of me as having a number of tropes: the greenness trope of the chair, its shape
trope, its size trope and maybe more. It is important to clarify that it is the specific
greenness trope of this specific chair that my perceptual experience represents the
chair as having. If I were to look at another, numerically different but
indistinguishable green chair, my perceptual experience would represent it as
having a numerically different greenness trope.
If there is a match between the tropes I perceptually represent the object in front
of me as having and the properties the object in front of me in fact has, then my
perceptual experience is veridical. If there is a mismatch, then my perceptual
experience is not veridical. Sometimes our perceptual experience represents
something as having some tropes, whereas there is nothing in front of us. In this
case, there is a serious mismatch between the tropes the experience represents and
the actual properties out there. This is what happens when we are hallucinating.
Our perceptual experiences can be correct or incorrect: the tropes we perceive
objects as having may or may not match the property-instances these objects in fact
have. Thus, the proposal I am making is a version of the representational view:
perceptual experiences do represent objects as having certain properties—just that
these properties are tropes. As a result, the advantages of the representational view
come for free.
And this version of representationalism is also in agreement with what I take to
be the core claim of the relational view: that perception is a genuine relation
between two particular token entities as, according to my proposal, perception is a
genuine relation between the perceiver and the trope represented in her perceptual
experience, both of which are particular token entities.
This perceptual relation is of course quite different from the one the relationalists
talk about. They hold that ‘‘perceiving is […] a matter of the conscious presentation
of actual constituents of physical reality themselves’’ (Brewer 2006, p. 172; see also
Campbell 2002, p. 116). As we shall see in Sect. 4.3, the talk of the constituents of
an experience can be difficult to make sense of, but the main idea is that the relation
that constitutes my perceptual experience is a relation between myself and the actual
object, say, a token plastic cup, that I am staring at.
I agree with the relationalist that our perceptual experience is a relation between
the perceiver and something particular. But I differ from the relational view in as
much as my claim is that this ‘something particular’ is not the actual object that is
being experienced, but the trope I experience it as having. When I am staring at the
plastic cup, it is the trope I experience it as having that is the token particular that I
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stand in a relation to. In short, I stand in a relation to a particular: the trope that is
part of my perceptual content. It is in this very specific sense that we can say that
some particular is a constituent of my perceptual experience.
To sum up, while my version of the representational view is consistent with one
of the main claims of the relational view, it flatly contradicts some other relational
claims. The question is whether it has some of the most important explanatory
advantages as the relational view. If it does, then, given that it also has all the
explanatory advantages of the representational view, we have good reason to accept
it.
4.1 The Particularity of Perception
The first important explanatory advantage of the relational view was that it can
explain the particularity of our perceptual experiences. As, according to the trope
representationalist account, our perceptual experience always represents particulars,
that is, tropes, on the face of it my proposal seems to capture the particularity of our
perceptual experience. But let us return to the example of the two indistinguishable
pillows.
Contrast the following two scenarios. In the first one, I am looking at a pillow, x,
and, unbeknownst to me, it gets replaced with another, indistinguishable pillow, y. I
do not notice that the two pillows are different: I have no idea that the first pillow, x,
was replaced by the second pillow, y. In the second scenario, I am looking at pillow
x all along—it does not get replaced with a different pillow. The relationalist points
out that the representationalist needs to have a story about how to distinguish
between these two experiences.
If we accept that the properties we perceptually represent are tropes, then we
have an easy answer to this question. I attribute the very same tropes to the pillow in
the two perceptual experiences. Importantly, I attribute the trope of being the very
same particular token object as the one I saw a moment ago (as object permanence
is supposed to be perceptually represented, see Spelke 1990, 1994). But the
attribution of this trope is incorrect in the first case, it is correct in the second case.
In the first case, after the switching of the pillows, this attributed trope (of being the
very same token object as the one I was looking at a moment ago) does not match
the property-instance of the pillow itself (which has the property of being a very
different token object from the one I was looking at a moment ago). In the second
scenario, in contrast, the attribution of this trope is veridical. Thus, if we accept
trope representationalism, there is a simple and principled way of differentiating the
two experiences: the experience is veridical in the second scenario and it is non-
veridical in the first.6
6 To put it more precisely, it is veridical in the second scenario and not fully veridical in the first. In the
first scenario, there will be tropes such that the experience attributes them to the perceived object and the
object in fact has them. Shape, size and color tropes are possible examples. But this experience will not be
veridical when it comes to the trope of being the very same particular token object as the one I saw a
moment ago.
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4.2 Perception and Demonstrative Reference
The second explanatory advantage of the relational view was that it can ground our
demonstrative thoughts. Campbell’s point was that perception acquaints us not just
with ‘the postulated occupant of a particular functional role’, but with the particular
object (and its substance) itself.
But if we accept trope representationalism about perceptual experiences, then
perceptual experiences do not merely represent ‘the postulated occupant of a
particular functional role’. They represent particular tropes. So what could we say
about the eavesdropping example in the framework I have suggested? When I am
eavesdropping and come to the conclusion that my neighbor has a mirror on the wall
that divides his apartment from mine, I attribute property-types to this object: the
property-type of being a mirror, of having a certain size, etc. But when I set eyes on
the mirror itself, my perceptual experience attributes particular tropes to it: the trope
of being this particular mirror and the trope of having this specific size, for example.
Thus, I represent the mirror very differently.
My perceptual experience does not ‘‘confront me with the individual substance
itself’’, as Campbell suggests, but it does represent a particular trope itself, rather
than a postulated occupant of a mere functional role. And the particularity of the
represented trope can ground our demonstrative thoughts as much as the particularity
of the perceived ‘‘individual substance’’ can.
4.3 Trope Representationalism Versus Relationalism
We have seen that the trope representationalist view can preserve some of the most
important considerations in favor of the relational view: it can explain the particularity
of perception and account for the possibility of demonstrative reference. But it is still
very different from relationalism. Most importantly, according to the relational view,
the perceived external object is a constituent of our perceptual experience. According
to the trope representationalist position, the perceived object is not a constituent of our
perceptual experience. Trope representationalism has to break with relationalism at
this point.
Is it a disadvantage of my trope representationalist account that it cannot account
for this intuition? One could argue that it is not. One may find it odd to talk about a
mind-independent object as a constituent of our perceptual experience. I suspect that
some of the reluctance towards the relational view is due to this feature of the
account (Crane 2006 talks about such criticisms of the relational view). But there is
nothing odd about the view that a particular trope I represent the object in front of
me as having is a constituent of my perceptual experience.
Thus, if someone is moved by some of the intuitions I mentioned in Sect. 2: the
particularity of perception and the possibility of singular reference and direct
realism, may find trope representationalism more palatable than the relational view.
Finally, a last word about the structure of the argument I presented in this paper. I
argued that if we accept representationalism, endorsing its trope representationalist
version helps us to deflect the most important relationalist objections. But there are
other ways of dealing with some of these relationalist objections within the
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framework of representationalism than trope representationalism. More specifically,
it has been argued that if we interpret perceptual content as ‘Russellian’, ‘gappy’,
‘Russellian gappy’, ‘Fregean gappy’, ‘singular’, ‘object-involving’ or ‘singular-
when-filled’ (see, e.g., Soteriou 2000; Martin 2002; Loar 2003; Tye 2007;
Schellenberg 2010; and see Chalmers 2004, 2006; Siegel 2006b; Bach 2007 for
discussion), then we can account for the particularity of perception.
Without analyzing these (very different) proposals in any depth, I want to point
out an important advantage of trope representationalism over any of them. If we
accept trope representationalism, we get a very simple conception of perceptual
content: the sum total of perceptually attributed tropes. The ‘Russellian’, ‘gappy’,
‘singular’, ‘object-involving’ or ‘singular-when-filled’ conceptions of perceptual
content, in contrast, are much more complicated—as David Chalmers says, these
accounts are thinking about perceptual content as a ‘‘structured complex’’ (Chalmers
2006, p. 54; Thompson 2009 describes them aptly as ‘‘structured propositions’’). To
put it simply, perceptual content is a ‘structured complex’ of some kind of
combination of property-types and a particular object (or maybe an empty slot where
the particular object could/would fit into, or maybe an existential quantifier). These
accounts of perceptual content may be perfectly feasible and they may even account
for some of the relationalist intuitions, but they, unlike trope representationalism,
lead to an overly complicated account of perceptual content, which is the reason why
many relationalists dismiss these account (see esp. Brewer forthcoming, Martin
forthcoming) and why even many representationalists have expressed doubts about
whether this conception of perceptual content is suitable for doing all the theoretical
work the concept of perceptual content is normally expected to do (see, e.g.,
Chalmers 2006). My trope representationalism avoids these lines of criticism.
5 Conclusion
Finally, I need to say something to those who are skeptical of the very idea of tropes
and who are inclined to resist my argument for this reason. One of the most
influential objections to trope theory, or the very idea of tropes, is Chris Daly’s
claim that all of the arguments for the existence of tropes can be rephrased in terms
of property-types (Daly 1997).
The argument I presented in this paper could be thought to provide some reason
for being less skeptical of tropes. It may be worth recapitulating the structure of my
argument. I made a conditional claim. If we assume that the properties represented
in perception are tropes, then we can preserve the explanatory advantages of the
representational view as well as many explanatory advantages of the relational
view. This conditional claim may give us some reason to accept the antecedent of
the conditional: that the properties represented in perception are tropes.
It is important to note that the claim that the properties represented in perception
are tropes in itself carries very little ontological weight: it does not say anything
about whether there are tropes. Maybe there are no tropes, only universals and their
instances, but we (wrongly) perceive objects as having tropes. If, however, we add a
further, not particularly strong premise that perception does not systematically
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misrepresent the world, then, provided that the argument I presented in this paper is
correct, we have some reason to conclude that there are tropes and when you
perceptually attribute a trope to the apple in front of you and do so correctly, there
really is a trope (of the apple) in front of you.
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